Singling Out Objects without Sortals by Newstead, Anne













I argue that there are ways of individuating the objects of perception without using sortal concepts.  The result is an moderate anti-sortalist position on which one can single out objects without knowing what sort of thing those objects are.  

Sortal concepts
Sortal concepts are concepts of kinds of things. Examples of sortal terms include:  ‘bat’, ‘tiger’, ‘book’, ‘shovel’, ‘carrot’.  Examples of non-sortal terms are:  ‘white’, ‘snow’, ‘slimy’, ‘milk’. Sortal concepts play a role in answering questions such as: ‘What kind of thing is x? How many Fs are there? Is this F the same as that?’. 
Despite being a technical term among philosophers, there are several different conceptions of sortal concepts (Feldman 1973).  The conception we shall employ here is Wiggins’ conception of a sortal as providing an answer to the Aristotelian ‘what is it?’ question when asked of an individual (Wiggins 1980).  The expected answer will mention the kind to which the individual belongs,  where there is usually some procedure or body of knowledge for individuating members of that kind.  This is the case even if the individuation depends on expert knowledge.  For example, one can judge  ‘That is a specimen of poison ivy’ on the basis of recognising the leaves. But one can also make the judgement on the basis of expert testimony.  
Grasping the kind to which the object belongs enables one to make judgements about its numerical identity over time. For there is, on Wiggins’ Aristotelian view, a general presumption that individual things have relatively stable identities over time:  they cannot change from being one sort to another.​[1]​  A dog cannot change into a cat.  Thus, if one sees that there’s a dog in one’s garage and returns to find a cat, then one can conclude that the individual one initially observed is gone and one is now dealing with a different individual.  In this way, although sortals can be used to group individuals into classes, they can also be used to ask and answer questions concerning the numerical identity of an individual.  In particular, if x at t1 is an F and y at t2 is a G, where F and G are different sorts, then x  y, and conversely, if x=y then  x and y must be of the same sort.  This is a consequence of Leibniz’s law that if two things are identical, they must share all of their properties (Wiggins 1980). If one believes that there are objectively different sorts of things, then being a certain sort of thing will count as one of the properties of an object that can figure in Leibniz’s Law. Leibniz’s Law does not permit the use of observer/subject-relative properties to differentiate objects. The use of such properties would not provide a reliable way of differentiating  objects, because two observers may take up different responses to the same object without it being indicative of any intrinsic difference in the object.  Frege’s famous example of the morning star and the evening star illustrates the point:  although there is one object, now known to be the planet Venus, there are two different temporal perspectives one can occupy with respect to the same object.  One should not conclude from the difference in perspectives that one is dealing with two different objects.   
The Arguments of Sortalists 
Sortalists are persuaded by the consideration that questions of identity such as ‘Is this the same as that?’ appear to have no determinate answer until one specifies the kind of things being compared.  For example, handling two apples, one can ask ‘Is this the same fruit as that?’ and the answer is ‘Yes’.  But one can also ask ‘Is this the same apple as that?’ and the answer is clearly ‘No’. Thus depending on the sortal employed, one arrives at different answers to questions of identity. One can also raise questions about the identity of an object over time such as ‘Is this the same apple as the one I touched yesterday?’. In some cases, though, the specification of a sortal appears unnecessary.  There is a more direct route to differentiating objects using basic spatiotemporal principles such as the principles that one object cannot be in two places at once and two distinct objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. 
Sortalists could dispute the adequacy of such principles as ‘one object per place’ by mentioning the possibility that two objects of different kinds might co-occupy the same place. The example of a statue and a lump of clay is sometimes used to illustrate this possibility.  The example can be seen to play into the hands of a sortalist.  For if one grants that there are two objects there, then it will be necessary to call on sortals to differentiate them. However, the example can be objected to on the grounds that it appeals to two different levels of description to generate the different sortals. The description of the object as a lump of matter is a lower-level description than the description of it as a statue. The description f is a lower level description than the description g  just in case there are many different fs that could realize a g, but not vice versa.  There are many different ways of arranging a lump of matter so as to generate a given statue of some figure, but there are not many different ways of arranging a given statue to generate  a given lump of clay.  
Appeal to cases using the form-matter distinction, then, is not a good way to justify sortalism.  It is more promising to look at the argument that questions of diachronic identity cannot be determined without an appeal to a sortal concept.  So long as it is agreed that a thing cannot change from one basic sort to another, a sortal provides a way of drawing the boundaries around an object over time.  However, there are some cases of change that are difficult to judge.  A sortalist says that when a caterpillar changes into a butterfly, that ‘caterpillar’ and ‘butterfly’ are not basic, substance sortals but phase sortals.  An individual can change phase sortals, but not a substance sortal.  However, if a lump of uranium is changed into a lump of lead by a nuclear transmutation, then the sortalist must say that ‘lump of uranium’ and ‘lump of lead’ are phase sortals of the same underlying substance, the aggregate of matter.  But this conclusion is in tension with the other sortalist view that notions like ‘aggregate of matter’ are too vague to count as sortals. They do not supply a principle of individuation for distinct kinds of things.  
Finally, some sortalists have in mind not only the argument that sortals are needed to ensure that questions of identity have determinate answers, but that sortals are needed by us to answer these identity questions once raised. This argument for sortalism has it place in a concern with language and epistemology rather than metaphysics.  A rough outline of the argument is as follows:  
(1) Singular reference to an object requires knowing which object it is. 
(2) Knowing which object something is requires knowing what sortal concept it falls under.
(3) Therefore, one cannot refer to any object without knowing what sortal concept it falls under.
I argue that there is no need to accept premise (2) of the simple argument.  There are ways of individuating the objects of perception without imposing sortal concepts on those objects.  The result is an anti-sortalist position on which one can refer to objects without knowing what sort of thing those objects are.  

Reasons to Reject Sortalism 
It may be that sortalism is true as a metaphysical thesis, but false if taken as epistemic thesis.  Thus, things may really fall into different sorts, without its being the case that one needs an explicit understanding of those different sorts in order to differentiate things.  In the Foundations of Arithmetic where he introduces the notion of a criterion of identity,  Frege says that one need not always be able to supply a criterion of identity for an object, but that one must know it exists if there is to be a determinate answer to an identity question raised concerning different presentations of that object.  Wiggins agrees with this approach, stating that what renders an identity statement determinate is that there should exist a sortal concept under which both items fall.  Wiggins does not require that one actually be in possession of the correct sortal concept in order to formulate identity judgements, although the capacity to evaluate such judgements will depend ultimately on having such concepts. For these reasons, Wiggins’ sortalism may not be vulnerable to attacks on epistemic sortalism, my main target. 
Dummett is a better exemplar of someone who espouses sortalism as a epistemic thesis.  He writes, for example, “merely to know that a name has as its referent an object with which we are confronted, or with which we are presented in some way, at a particular time, is not yet to know what object the name stands for: we do not know this until we know, in Frege’s terminology, ‘how to recognise the object as the same again’...” (Dummett 1973, p. 545). This is an argument for sortalism, since sortal concepts are said to supply criteria of identity for objects, and such criteria are said to be needed to ‘recognize the object as the same again’, which in turn is needed to know the reference of a name.  
Here is a thought experiment of the kind that makes such epistemic sortalism look like it must be false, as regards demonstrative reference.  Suppose that Sam is examining artefacts in an anthropology museum and comes across a strange item, which looks like a small cylindrical woven basket with a lid on top.  Unbeknownst to Sam, the item is a Japanese eel trap.  Sam thinks, holding the item, ‘This is so intricately woven’.  Sam does not really know what sort of item he is handling, at least not with a degree of specificity sufficient to differentiate it from other similar shaped artefacts on display.  Nonetheless, merely by looking at the item, it seems plausible to say that Sam does know which item he is thinking about.  
In the above example it is not the case that Sam has no sortal classification at his disposal.  He knows, for example, that he is handling a kind of basket, although he does not know its use.  But it remains true that it cannot be this general sortal classification that is doing all the work in providing discriminating knowledge of the object. Sam also knows where the object is, or at least where it seems to be located, relative to himself.  This knowledge of the object’s location grounds his ability to demonstratively refer to the object. It appears to be a main factor in a case like this in determining whether Sam can single the object out.  It is not clear, yet, whether Sam also needs some sortal classification to refer to the object.  What is clear is that he does not need a canonical sortal classification of the object in order to single it out. So this thought experiment supports a position of moderate anti-sortalism, on which the existence of sortal ignorance is compatible with singular reference.  Moderate anti-sortalism contrasts with extreme anti-sortalism, on which no sortal concepts are required to single out objects at all (Cassam 1997, Hirsch 1982). 
The same thought experiment provides support for the idea that we can name an object by being perceptually acquainted with it  and “baptising” it as Kripke says.  Even though Sam does not know he is handling an eel trap, he can decide to name the object that he is handling ‘Muki’.  He can then refer to that object using its name.  He may have some difficulty in articulating to others what it is exactly that he is talking about when he refers to Muki. In order to commuicate thoughts about Muki to others, he must use some general description true of Muki, such as the notion that it is ‘an odd shaped thing being exhibited in the museum’. However, it is not clear that such a description is a sortal.  And once again it does not follow that an explicit understanding of the object’s specific sortal classification is needed before it can be named and thought about. 
  So the position that an explicit understanding of sortal classifications is needed to refer to objects or single them out perceptually seems to be undermined.  Of course it is possible that when Dummett and other sortalists plead that one needs a criterion of identity to refer to an object by means of a name, these theorists would allow that people can have implicit conceptions of an object’s criterion of identity. 
Ways of Rejecting Classic Sortalism
 Classic sortalism is the thesis that singling out of objects depends on using specific sortal concepts. There are two ways of arguing against classic sortalism. One way is to deny flat out that sortals are required to perceptually single out objects. A radical version of this thesis would amount to a denial of the need for a principle of individuation at all in singling out objects.  So far as I know no one has rejected sortalism on these grounds.  Even an extreme anti-sortalist like Michael Ayers thinks we do single out objects according to principles, only that these principles have to do with spatiotemporal continuity and not sortal classification (Ayers 1973).​[2]​  This brings us to the second way of arguing against sortalism.  One can argue that there is some general concept such as the concept of a physical object that does all the work of sortals in individuating objects and should accordingly be considered a sortal concept.  This second strategy is sortalist in that it acknowledges the need for a sortal principle of individuation to single out objects.  But it is also moderately anti-sortalist insofar as it denies the need to have mastered specific sortal concepts in order to single out objects.  
Is ‘Physical Object’ a Sortal Concept?
In a series of articles, Fei Xu and Susan Carey  have championed the second strategy, insisting that “If representations of sortal concepts are those representations that provide criteria for individuation and numerical identity, young infants do represent at least one sortal concept, physical object, itself” (Carey & Xu 1999).  The proposal flies in the face of a long tradition of philosophical opposition to the idea that concepts such as thing, object, substance, or material object are too vague to enable us to trace out the careers of individual objects.  Wiggins (1980) objects to the idea that such concepts could be sortal on the grounds that “…a formal concept like entity or substance has no autonomous individuative force of its own, and must be supplemented, whenever it appears in contexts of identification, according to the kind of individuation in question”.  Wiggins is objecting to the claim that the philosopher’s formal idea of a substance or object has individuative force.  The philosophical idea of a substance is just the idea of a relatively self-sufficient individual that exists over time, and the philosophical idea of an object may be just whatever answers to a singular term or name. Xu and Carey, however, do not use ‘physical object’ to mean an object or substance in some philosophical sense.  They define a ‘physical object’ as a Spelke object, which they gloss as “any entity that is three-dimensional, is bounded, and retains its boundaries as it moves through space and time” (Carey & Xu, 1999).  Spelke-objects are so called because they obey the spatiotemporal principles first probed by Elizabeth Spelke to test for object permanence using dishabituation  techniques in very young infants (Spelke 1993, 1995). 
Crucially, Spelke objects are individuated more coarsely than objects individuated according to qualitative properties like color, texture, and shape.  Intuitively, then,  there will not be a one to one mapping between what mature adults recognize as basic macroscopic objects and what young infants operating with just the Spelke notion of an object will represent as objects.  For example,  Xu, Carey & Welch (1999) found that 10 month old infants treated a stationary conjunction of a toy truck on a duck as a single entity, expecting them to move together. Older children showed surprise if the conjunction did not come apart when lifted, presumably because they decided that there were two different sorts of things instantiated and hence two objects. So whereas older children and adults do not count the stationary duck-truck duo as a single object, it counts as an object for the younger children unless they shown that each part can move separately.  
    The classical, epistemic sortalist claims that a judgement like ‘That is pretty’ lacks truth conditions until we know what kind of thing is being picked out by the demonstrative ‘that’.  Proponents of the new anti-sortalism claim that in some situations it is just perceptually salient which thing is being referred to by the demonstrative, without using a sortal term. The anti-sortalist position, as we have seen, can be supplemented by appealing to work in developmental psychology using the notion of Spelke objects.  However, some doubts remain about the adequacy of the anti-sortalist view on offer.  
    It  does not seem that it will be possible to re-identify individuals over time just using the notion of a Spelke object.  Motion and spatial properties will be enough to keep track of a single individual if constantly observed, but not to guard against unnoticed substitutions during gaps in perception. Suppose a grey cat disappears under a car and sometime later a black cat emerges.  The black cat emerges, moreover, in just the place that the grey cat would emerge, had it walked in a straight line from back of car to front.  Very young infants that do not differentiate objects according to colour but only using motion principles may assume that the same cat has emerged from the car.  So the Spelke object concept by itself is not sufficient to answer questions of identity like ‘Is this cat the one I saw a minute earlier?’.  Thus a position like Xu and Carey’s ultimately points back to the need for sortal concepts traditionally conceived.  
   These remarks are not meant to be a criticism of Xu and Carey’s position so much as a warning not to think of their work or Spelke’s work as supporting extreme anti-sortalism. At best, the work points towards a compromise position.  It explains how, on the one hand, there is a gross level of representation at which objects can be represented without sortal classification, and how, on the other hand, the absence of any specific sortal concepts would preclude object individuation.
For to answer the question, ‘Is this Spelke object the same as that?’ in the affirmative is not to arrive at the conclusion that there is some one numerically self-identical particular object.  Rather all that one can conclude from the identity of Spelke object representations is that those representations belong to an equivalence of representations of objects with the same motion and unity characteristics.  
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^1	  Such a prohibition on switching sorts applies to individuals, not species. To take into account evolution, Aristotle’s view has to be modified to say that things cannot change from one sort to another within an individual’s lifetime, though a species as a whole may evolve over many generations.  
^2	  There may be a slight contrast between the views espoused by Ayers in his 1973 article and his 1991 book on Locke. His  later work concludes that we simply recognise objects as ‘natural unities’ without calling on sortal principles.  But it is hard to see how the conception of objects employed here could be, in the end, anything other than a space-occupier or Spelke object. 
